The "Ch. 2" Argument
1. "That-being-than-which-none-greater-can-be-thought" exists in the mind.
2. Assume that it exists in the mind alone.
3. One can think of it existing in reality.
4. One has thought, then, of a being greater than "that-which-none-greater-can-be-thought, which is absurd.
5. Therefore, "that-being, etc." exists in reality.
My Reduction
1. "That-being, etc." exists in the mind.
2. It is greater to exist necessarily than not.
3. "That-being, etc." exists necessarily.
Problem
1. "That-
man-than-which-none-greater-can-be-thought" exists in the mind.
2. It is greater to necessarily exist than not.
3. Therefore, "that-
man, etc." exists necessarily.
This is obviously not true. Why not? Because, one would say, it is beyond the nature of man to exist necessarily. That is, the terms are incompatible.
Problem With Anselm
In order for the "Ch. 2" argument to work, one
must assume that there exists such a being whose nature is capable of admitting of necessary existence. That is, one is assuming what Anselm has set out to prove.
Resolution (the "ch. 3" argument)
1. God, if He exists, is a necessary being.
2. If God does not exist, it is impossible for Him to exist. (Defined as a necessary being, nothing could be different that would make Him exist, that is, possibility implies contingency.)
3. It is possible for God to exist.
4. Therefore, God does not not exist.
5. Therefore God exists.
Problem
Is the idea of a necessary being, i.e., one that has its existence
per se, an impossibility? It's obviously not immediately self-contradictory, as in a round-square. But is it like "greatest prime number", which at first appears reasonable, but further study shows to be impossible?
Further study has not shown
per se existence to be impossible.
At the least, then, we can say about Anselm's argument that, so long as God's existence remains possible, He exists, and must necessarily be thought to exist. However, I'd be so bold as to say that one is not merely putting words together when one says "to exist per se", but that these terms are understandable and reasonable when put together. If so, then the "ch. 3" argument works.